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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
matter how clearly erroneous a judge's opinion may be, he
still has the right to comment on the disputed facts.'3
Moreover, very strong expressions of opinion on the facts
are, tolerated; indeed, sometimes, they may be necessary."
For instance, it has been held that the statement in the
charge to the jury, "In the opinion of the court, the defendant is guilty", did not constitute error prejudicial to
the defendant.' 5 Only the case of a very plain error on the
part of the trial judge will cause the supreme court to reverse on account of his comments on the balance of the
testimony.16
It is respectfully submitted that Pennsylvania's stand
in the matter is the better one. The jury should be aided
by the trial court in cases of difficulty, and inspired with
confidence in cases of doubt. The Pennsylvania rule supplies the available medium to effect those ends. No more
cogent reason for the rule can be advanced to counteract
the minimized possibilities of abuse of the power under
discussion.
Regis Francis Mahady

RESPONSIBILITY OF PRINCIPAL FOR NEGLIGENTLY INFLICTED INJURIES CAUSED BY AGENTS
USE OF UNAUTHORIZED INSTRUMENTALITY
To settle an hitherto undecided point in the law of
master and servant in Pennsylvania was the task of Justice
Maxey of the Supreme Court in the case of TVesolowski v.
John Hancock Life Insurance Company.' The facts of the

case are briefly these:

The defendant, an insurance com-

'sLong v. Ramsay, 1 S. & R. 72; Oyster v. Longnecker, 16 Pa.
269.

14
Leibig
5

v. Steiner, 94 Pa. 466; Bitner v. Bitner, 65 Pa. 347.
1 Com. v. Clymer, 1 Leh. L. J. 311. See also McCain v. Comm.,
110 Pa. 263; Winther v. Second St. Pass. Ry. Co., 159 Pa. 628.
loSuplee v. Timothy, 124 Pa. 375; 23 W. N. C. 386,
1162 AtL 166 (1932).
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pany, employed Adams to solicit life insurance business and
to make weekly collections of insurance. His territory
was less than a square mile in Philadelphia. The defendant did not require him to use a car, though its superintendent when informed that Adams had a car, said, "If
you have one, you might as well use it." Adams maintained and operated the car at his own expense. While he
was on his way to make collections in his car he negligently struck the plaintiff who was thereby seriously and
permanently injured. The plaintiff was given a verdict
against the defendant but the latter's motion for judgment n. o. v. was granted by the court on the ground that
the doctrine of "respondeat superior" was not applicable to
the case. On appeal the judgment was affirmed. The
lower court's opinion was quoted by the Supreme Court
in these words, "While the general rule of law is that a
principal is liable for the negligence of his agent, while in
performance of the agent's duty, and the reason for the
application of this rule is that the agent, during the performance of his duty, is presumably under the direction
and control of the employer, where, as here, the instrumentality used by the agent or employee is not furnished at
the direction of the employer, or subject to the employer's
direction or control, the employer should not be held responsible." This statement is elaborated upon by Justice
Maxey when he says: "To hold a master legally responsible for the act of a servant who is engaged in furthering
his master's business, and who while doing so negligently
uses some instrumentality that carries him from place to
place, it must either be proved that the master exercises
actual or potential control over that instrumentality or
the use of the instrumentality at the time and place of the
act complained of must be of such character and vital importance in furthering the business of the master that the
latter's actual or potential control of it at the time and
place may be reasonably inferred." The test which the
court gives of the master's responsibility in cases of this
sort, is the authority to control the servant's use of the
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instrumentality with which the injury is inflicted. Since
the defendant had no control over Adam's car no liability
existed.
In view of the fact that this is a novel question in
Pennsylvania and that no authorities are cited by the court
in support of its holding an examination of the decisions
in other jurisdictions on similar facts might prove valuable
and interesting. A Maryland case is strikingly similar in
its facts.2 The defendant was engaged in the "house furnishing and clothing business" and employed Talbot as a
solicitor and collector whose activities as such were confined to a particular locality. The car fare necessary between the place of business and the territory to be solicited
was paid by the defendant. Talbot owned a car and in
mentioning this fact to the defendant the latter said, "Well,
I would not use it for quite a while-for a couple of weeks
or so." Talbot testified that the defendant "never made
any objection, and he never a'pproved" in regard to the use
of the car. The plaintiff was injured by the alleged negligence of Talbot in the operation of his car and suit was
brought against the defendant. In reversing the lower
court's judgment for the plaintiff the upper court said;
"This evidence is so indefinite, uncertain, and lacking in
probative force that it is not, we think, legally sufficient
to go to the jury as tending to show that the use of the
automobile by Talbot was authorized by the defendant,
either expressly or impliedly." The automobile was used
for the convenience of Talbot and was not at all necessary
in the performance of his duty under his employment by
the defendant, nor was its use in any way beneficial to the
defendant. This too might be said of the Wesolowski case.
There is also nothing in the evidence tending to show that
Talbot was authorized, either expressly or impliedly, to
use the automobile in the service of the defendant at the
time the accident occurred. If the test given in the Pennsylvania case were applied to the facts here it would ap'Goldsmith v. Chesebrough, 113 AtI. 285 (1921).
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pear that the result in the Maryland case is correct for
surely it cannot be said that the defendant had any control of the servant's use of the instrumentality with which
the injury was inflicted. The test laid down by the Maryland court is based on whether the servant's use of the
instrumentality was or was not authorized, expressly or
impliedly, by the master. Applying this test to the
Wesolowski case the question arises, was the remark of the
superintendent to Adams evidence of an implied authorization to use the car? Evidently not, for the court said,
"The employer was indifferent as to whether Adams walked, rode a bicycle or operated a motor car to reach the
people with whom he transacted business."
The followers of the Wesolowski ruling will be heartened by the decision of an Arkansas case.3 The defendant, a
railroad, employed a boy, whose duty it was to call different train crews. These crews all lived within less than a
mile and it, was easily possible to give notice to them by
walking to their residences. However, with the knowledge of the railroad's agents the boy used a bicycle with
which while making a call, he negligently struck the plaintiff. The plaintiff contended that the boy was impliedly authorized to use the bicycle because he was directed to make
the call and the agent directing him knew that he was using
the instrumentality in the performance of his duty. The
appellate court in reversing the trial court said, "The
mere fact that the agents of the railway company knew
that the call boy was using the instrumentality in the performance of his service was not an implied authorization
of the use thereof by the master nor sufficient evidence
of the necessity therefor." The court, as in the Maryland case, makes the test of the master's liability the authorization, express or implied, of the servant's use of the
instrumentality. It is evident that defendant through its
agent in the Pennsylvania case knew that Adams was using
a car in his work, but this fact alone according to the
$St. Louis, I. M. and S. Ry. Co. v. Robinson, 173 S. W. 822 (1915),
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Arkansas ruling, is not enough to set up an implied authorization of the use thereof nor sufficient evidence of the
necessity therefor. Under the "authorization test" then,
the Wesolowski decision seems to be correct.
When a servant owns an automobile and it is habitually used in the defendant's business with the knowledge
and assent of the defendant's agents and the defendant
furnishes gasoline and oil and does repair work on the
car, an inference arises that the defendant impliedly authorizes the use of the car. An express agreement for the
use of the car is not necessary. 4 None of these facts appeared in the Wesolowski case. A Missouri court denied
recovery to the plaintiff in a case of the type under discussion because, "In the present case there was no evidence
adduced that Emmet Liese's contract of employment did
embrace the use of an automobile. Neither is there anything in the evidence tending to show that it was within
the contemplation of the parties that an automobile was
to be used by Liese for the purpose of transacting the defendant's business; nor is there evidence that the use of an
automobile was necessary or beneficial to the defendant in
the performance of Liese's duties under his said employment."' 8 This statement might without strain be applied
to the facts in the Pennsylvania case.
A Tennessee court in an exhaustive opinion on the
general subject held that where an employer neither
owned, used, nor had any need for an automobile in connection with its business and did not authorize an employee
tc use his individual car in connection with his duties, and
had no actual knowledge that he was so using it the employer was not liable under the doctrine of "respondeat
The court approves the "authorization test"
superior."
mentioned in the case above. An Oregon court approaches
the doctrine of our Pennsylvania case in the matter of the
*Gordiner v. St. Louis Screw Co., 210 S. W. 930 (1919).
BMcCaughen v. Missouri Pacific R. Co., 274 S. W. 97 (1925).
lKennedy v. Union Charcoal and Chemical Co., 4 S. W. (2nd)

354 (1928).
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control which a master should exercise over the servant's
instrumentality, when it held that where evidence showed
that an agent was hired to solicit orders, but the company employing him retained no authority as to where or
how he should travel the company will not be liable for
injuries resulting from the negligent driving of a car by
the agent.' Of course the defendant in the Wesolowski
case did retain authority to direct Adams where to travel
but certainly not how to travel. On this phase of the question the Oregon case supports the Pennsylvania doctrine.
An Iowa court deciding the question for the first time
approves the doctrine given in the Maryland case as well
as in the Missouri, Tennessee and Arkansas cases cited
above. 8
The issue was, where a messenger is provided
with no instrumentality for carrying on his work,
but usually uses a bicycle for that purpose, whether he may
without the knowledge or consent of the master, either
express or implied, borrow an automobile for such purpose.
The question was answered in the negative, the court referring to public policy as a consideration in the arrival at
such a conclusion.
It will be seen that all of the cases considered except
the Oregon case make the test of the master's liability the
authorization, either express or implied, of the servant's
use of the instrumentality. This would seem to be a logical method of determining liability, for why should a
master be liable for the negligent operation of his servant's
car when the use thereof was not authorized, expressly or
impliedly? Justice Maxey makes the test one of the
master's control over the servant's car, but how can a
master control his servant's use of a car unless the use
thereof was authorized? When a master gives authority,
control is the result thereof. Control should be inferred
from authorization and not authorization from control.
Control is an incident of authorization. While it is our
'Ramp v. Osborne, 239 Pac. 112 (1925).
$Hughes v. Western Union Telegraph Corp., 236 N. W. 8 (1931).
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opinion that the "authorization test" is the better and more
logical one, it seems that the result reached by the Pennsylvania court is correct. It is doubtful whether Adams
was impliedly authorized to use his car by the statement of
the superintendent. If this is true, then under the "authorization test" the master cannot be liable for the negligent
conduct of his servant when said servant uses an instrumentality without the authorization of said master. A fortiori
if the statement may be construed as implied authorization, then under the "test" the master would be liable for
the servant's negligent use of the instrumentality.
Henry V. Scheirer

PLEAS OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY AND AUTREFOIS
CONVICT OR ACQUIT
Although the purpose of the criminal law is to prevent
and punish offenses against the people, it also does much
to secure just treatment for the accused. Just as the civil
law protects a person from continuous persecution by one
who has an alleged claim against him, so the criminal law
provides that the state cannot repeatedly try a man for the
same offense. The weapons furnished to the accused in the
latter field of law are the pleas of double jeopardy and of
autrefois convict or autrefois acquit. In a general way
these pleas have much in common, but several distinct differences exist in their origin and application.
The plea of double jeopardy arises from Article I, section 10 of the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1874. It is
there stated, "No person shall, for the same offense, be twice
put in jeopardy of life or limb." This provision has remained the same throughout the various constitutions of
the state, and constructions thereof by the cases are equally
applicable regardless of the year in which they were
decided.

